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The Invention Secrecy Act: The USPTO as  
a Gatekeeper of National Security 
SCOTT D. LOCKE* 
ABSTRACT 
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) has the 
privilege of reviewing hundreds of thousands of inventions each year before the 
public learns about them.1  Consequently, the USPTO is uniquely positioned as a 
funnel through which the Government can collect information about new 
technologies and determine which ones have implications for the safety and 
welfare of the nation.  Under the Invention Secrecy Act, the Commissioner for 
Patents may order that an invention for which patent protection is sought be kept 
secret if disclosure of the invention might be detrimental to national security.2  
 In order for the USPTO to review patent applications and then to do its 
part in protecting national security, while respecting the rights of inventors, the 
Invention Secrecy Act provides for the implementation of a framework with three 
primary components: (1) the screening phase, which applies to all patent 
applications; (2) the maintenance of secrecy phase, which applies to those 
inventions for which the Government has made a determination of risk to national 
security; and (3) the compensation phase, which is the phase during which a 
patent applicant or patentee can request compensation for either or both the loss 
due to being required to keep the invention secret and the government’s use of the 
invention prior to issuance of the patent.  Failure of inventors to abide by the terms 
of and to follow the procedures promulgated under the Invention Secrecy Act can 
have dire consequences, and thus, applicants and persons who counsel them 
should be aware of its contours, how the USPTO implements it, and how courts 
interpret it.   
 
 
                                                          
*© 2019 Scott D. Locke (A.B., Biology, Brown University; J.D., University of Pennsylvania) is a partner at the law 
firm of Dorf & Nelson, LLP, where he is the chair of the Intellectual Property Department.  
1 Only inventors who seek U.S. patent protection are obligated to disclose their inventions to the USPTO.  Because 
most of the world operates on an absolute novelty standard, which means that if applicants publicly disclose their 
inventions before filing a priority patent application they will not be able to obtain patent rights, inventors who are 
familiar with the global patent process generally avoid making public disclosures before perfecting their ability to 
pursue patent protection.  The U.S. is unique in that it has an exception for inventors who file for patent protection 
within one year of publicly disclosing their inventions.  35 U.S.C.A. § 102 (West 2015). 
2 35 U.S.C.A. § 181 (West 2000).  The applicable statutory section separately discusses inventions in which the 
Government has a property interest and those in which the Government does not have a property interest.  Id. ¶¶ 1, 2. 
In the latter case, the Commissioner for Patents has the obligation to make the application available for inspection to 
the Atomic Energy Commission, the Secretary of Defense, and the chief officer of any other department or agency of 
the Government that the President designates as a defense agency. Id. ¶ 2. No such explicit obligation exists in the 
former case. 
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BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION SECRECY ACT 
 
The purpose of the Invention Secrecy Act is to prevent the exportation of information that 
is potentially detrimental to the security of the country.3  Prior to the Invention Secrecy Act, 
Congress had granted the USPTO the power to keep inventions secret during times of war.4  But 
in 1951, through the Invention Secrecy Act, Congress extended this authority to peacetime 
inventions in order to “prevent the dissemination of information contained in patent applications 
whenever the disclosure of such information by the issuance of a patent would jeopardize the 
national security.”5  However, as the Second Circuit has noted, Congress also has “a strong concern 
that inventors be encouraged to discover inventions having military value and to submit them to 
the United States.”6  Accordingly, in addition to granting powers to the USPTO, the Invention 
Secrecy Act provides applicants and patentees with a right to seek compensation for the damage 
caused by the order of secrecy and/or for the use of the invention by the Government prior to 
issuance of a patent.7 
The Invention Secrecy Act applies only to inventions that were created in the United 
States.8  Additionally, citizenship of the inventors is not relevant.9  However, there can be factual 
issues as to whether an invention was made abroad and thus falls outside of the Invention Secrecy 
Act.10 
 
THE SCREENING PHASE 
 
The Invention Secrecy Act applies to all inventions made within the United States, 
regardless of whether they are ultimately determined to have any implications for national 
security.11  In a small subset of the inventions disclosed in patent applications, the Government 
has a property interest.  For these inventions, the specific Government agency that has the property 
interest has the responsibility for notifying the USPTO that there is a need for a secrecy order.12   
                                                          
3 In re Application of Gaertner, 604 F.2d 1348, 1351 (C.C.P.A. 1979). 
4 Halpern v. United States, 258 F.2d 36, 38 (2d Cir. 1958) (discussing an act of July 1, 1940, 54 Stat. 710, and an act 
of October 6, 1917, 40 Stat. 394).  In 1951, the USPTO did not publish pending patent applications.  Consequently, 
the original Invention Secrecy Act did not address withholding publication.  Under current law, patent applications 
publish “promptly after the expiration of a period of 18 months from the earliest filing date from which a benefit is 
sought.”  35 U.S.C.A. § 122(b) (West 2013).  By statute, the USPTO withholds publication of patent applications that 
are subject to secrecy orders.  35 U.S.C.A. § 122(b)(2)(ii) (West 2013). 
5 Halpern, 258 F.2d at 38 (discussing an act of July 1, 1940, 54 Stat. 710, and an act of October 6, 1917, 40 Stat. 394). 
6 Id. at 39. 
7 35 U.S.C.A. § 183 (West 2012). 
8 37 C.F.R. § 5.11(e) (2015) (no license required if the invention was not made in the U.S). 
9 See Autovox, S.p.A. v. Lenco Italiana, S.p.A., 1980 WL 302220, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 1980) (citizenship of 
inventors is not relevant).  
10 See Sealectro Corp. v. L.V.C. Indus., Inc., 271 F. Supp. 835, 841–42 (E.D.N.Y. 1967). 
11 Thermovac Indus. Corp. v. Virtis Co., 285 F. Supp. 113, 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (“Sections 184 and 185 apply to cases 
where foreign patent applications are filed within six months after an application is filed in the United States.  Those 
sections are not limited to inventions involving the national security.”). 
12 MPEP § 115 [100-25] (9th ed. Rev. Jan. 2018). 
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In addition to inventions in which a federal agency has a property interest, there are 
inventions in which a federal agency does not have a property interest, but for which it has provided 
federal funding.  All inventions for which a federal agency has provided funding are within the 
scope of the Bayh-Dole Act.13  The Bayh-Dole Act outlines specific procedures that contractors 
(recipients of funding) must follow, including disclosing the subject invention to the funding 
agency prior to making any patent filings.14  Consequently, in theory, if any invention that fell 
within the Bayh-Dole Act were to implicate national security issues, the funding agency should 
become aware of the invention prior to the inventors reaching out to the USPTO.  Further, patent 
applications that have been made with Government funding are required to include a statement 
that identifies the source of the funding.15  Thus, when this statement is properly submitted to the 
USPTO, the USPTO can readily identify that a patent application belongs to a specific Government 
agency. 
However, for the vast majority of patent applications that are filed with the USPTO,  there 
is no Government property interest, and there has been no Government funding.  For these 
applications, the Commissioner for Patents makes an initial determination of whether disclosure 
of the invention might be detrimental to national security.16  If the Commissioner concludes that 
there might be such a risk for an invention, then the Commissioner will make the patent application 
that describes the invention available for inspection to the Atomic Energy Commission, the 
Secretary of Defense, and the chief officer of any other department or agency of the Government 
that the President designates as a defense agency of the United States.17 
Regardless of who owns a patent application, the filing of it triggers the screening phase.  
All patent applications, including provisional applications, nonprovisional applications, 
international applications filed under the Patent Cooperative Treaty, and international design 
applications filed under the Hague Agreement are subject to screening.18  After this phase starts, 
one of three things will happen.   
First, at some point prior to the expiration of the six month period after filing, the applicant 
will receive a foreign filing license, which is a determination that as far as the USPTO is concerned 
disclosure of the invention does not pose a threat to national security.19  As a matter of practice, 
the act of filing a patent application is deemed to include a petition for a foreign filing license, and 
the USPTO indicates on a filing receipt whether it has granted a foreign filing license.20  If the 
                                                          
13 35 U.S.C.A. § 200 et seq. 
14 Id. § 202(c)(1).   
15 Id. § 202(c)(6). One can readily see a problem in this system in that if an applicant does not comply with the Bayh-
Dole requirements, the funding agency might not know that a patent application that it funded was filed.  However, 
there is no requirement of proof of harm under the Bayh-Dole Act for an agency to take title if a contractor does not 
comply with its obligations.  Thus, if an applicant receives federal funding and files a patent application but does fully 
comply with the requirements of Bayh-Dole, the USPTO can still identify the patent application for the Government 
Agency to review, and that agency does not lose its right to void the contractor’s title to the invention. See Campbell 
Plastics Eng’g & Mfg., Inc. v. Brownlee, 389 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 2004).  This title is voidable, but it is not 
void, and thus, the government has the discretion to divest the contractor title but not the obligation to do so.  Cent. 
Admixture Pharmacy Servs., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiac Sols., P.C., 482 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert.. denied, 
552 U.S. 1038 (Mem) (2007); L-3 Communs. Corp. v. Jaxon Eng’g & Maint., Inc., 125 F. Supp. 3d 1155, 1179 (D. 
Colo. 2015). 
16 35 U.S.C.A. § 181 (West 2000). 
17 Id. 
18 37 C.F.R. § 5.1(b)(1) (2015); MPEP § 115 [100-25] (9th ed. Rev. Jan. 2018). 
19 37 C.F.R. § 5.11. 
20 37 C.F.R. § 5.12(a) (2015).  If an applicant does not receive a foreign filing license with the filing receipt, the 
applicant may petition for it.  37 C.F.R. § 5.12(b) (2015). 
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filing receipt indicates that the USPTO granted a foreign filing license, the applicant may pursue 
protection in foreign jurisdictions.21  This license applies to modifications, amendments and 
supplements that do not change the general nature of the invention.22 
Second, the USPTO might take no action within this six-month window.  If this occurs, 
then by statute, the applicant has the right to pursue protection in foreign jurisdictions.23  This six-
month window is not chosen arbitrarily.  In order to pursue rights in industrial designs or design 
patents in foreign jurisdictions, while claiming the benefit of the U.S. filing date, the foreign filings 
must be made within six months of the U.S. filing; for utility patent filings, there is a twelve-month 
window.24 
Third, the USPTO may issue a secrecy order.25  If this occurs, then the applicant is 
forbidden from pursuing protection of foreign rights and must not publicly disclose the invention.26  
If an applicant files for patent protection in a foreign jurisdiction when there is a secrecy order, or 
prior to six months after the U.S. filing without a foreign filing license, any U.S. patent that does 
issue will be invalid,27 and pending applications may be deemed abandoned by the USPTO.28  
There is also the potential for criminal penalties.29  The only cure to the invalidation of the patent 
is when, upon a showing that (i) the failure to obtain a license to file in foreign jurisdictions was 
through error and (ii) the patent did not disclose the subject matter of a secrecy order, the USPTO 
issues a retroactive foreign filing license.30  If the USPTO is not told about an improper foreign 
filing by an applicant, it might never learn of it.  However, the charge of invalidity by a defendant 
                                                          
21 37 C.F.R. § 5.15 (2015).  An international application for which the USPTO acts as a Receiving Office is not the 
filing of a foreign application for which there would be a potential violation of the Invention Secrecy Act.  37 C.F.R. 
§ 5.1(b)(2) (2015). 
22 37 C.F.R. § 5.11(3)(iii) (2015).  
23 35 U.S.C.A § 184(a) (West 2012); Transitron Elec. Corp. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 487 F. Supp. 885, 903 (D. Mass. 
1980) (no violation when foreign application filing more than six months after U.S. filing), aff’d, 649 F.2d 871 (1st 
Cir. 1981). Applicants should be aware that prior to the expiration of this six-month window, if there is no foreign 
filing license, the applicant still must comply with the federal export regulations. 37 C.F.R. § 5.11(c) (2015).  
24 Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 18336; Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property, July 14, 1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 11851. 
25 Although the determination of the need of a secrecy order may be made by the chief officer of a defense agency, 
the Commissioner for Patents is the person (through the person he or she delegates) who issues the order.  37 C.F.R. 
§ 5.2 (West 2005). 
26 See 35 U.S.C.A. § 181 (West 2000). 
27 Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Coleman Instruments, Inc., 338 F.2d 573, 576 (7th Cir. 1964). Notably, in Beckman 
the patent holder did later seek a retroactive license. However, because during litigation, the patent holder took the 
position that no license was needed, the USPTO deemed the act of not obtaining one, not to be inadvertent.  In re 
Application Filed November 22, 1952, 1967 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 8. The USPTO also took the position that even if the 
patent holder were to meet the inadvertence requirement, it would have failed to pursue the retroactive license 
diligently, and consequently was denied a license. Id. at 9. 
28 35 U.S.C.A. § 182 (West 2012). Case law under section 182 is understandably sparse, because if a patent application 
is deemed abandoned, it would never issue and thus never be enforceable.  See Gen. Elec. Co. v. United States, 1974 
WL 20489, *2 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (a section 182 defense of abandonment is irrelevant in a suit to enforce an issued patent).    
29 35 U.S.C.A. § 186 (West 2012) (violations of secrecy orders can lead to a fine of up to $10,000 and imprisonment 
of up to two years). 
30 Id. § 185.  The USPTO has been practical in its administration of these requirements.  For example, the 
Commissioner reversed an examiner who had denied a request for retroactive license and rejected a design patent 
when the license was granted six days after the applicant sent authorization for a foreign filing abroad but a day prior 
to the actual foreign filing.  Ex parte Glines, 159 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 181, 182 (B.P.A.I. 1968). 
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might arise in a patent infringement suit if the patent holder did not comply with its obligation to 
obtain a foreign filing license.31 
Applicants who find themselves running afoul of the foreign filing license requirement 
typically do so because they have added subject matter to an application, for example, in what 
would be classified as a continuation-in-part application in the U.S. or in a non-provisional 
application that claims priority to a provisional patent application, and prior to receiving a foreign 
filing license that covers the new material, the applicant effectuates a filing in a foreign 
jurisdiction.32   
As noted above, if an applicant files a foreign application without the necessary license but 
does so through error, then the applicant may petition the USPTO for a retroactive foreign filing 
license.33  The effect of the retroactive license dates back to issuance of the patent; therefore, in a 
litigation in which a retroactive foreign filing license has been obtained, damages are not limited 
to the date on which the license was issued.34  
Although a retroactive license is a potential option for inventors who fail to comply with 
the Invention Secrecy Act, an error in judgement such as filing with the knowledge of the 
requirement for obtaining a foreign filing license and relying on being able to obtain one 
retroactively is not the type of error that qualifies for a retroactive foreign filing license.35 A court 
may review a denial of issuance of a retroactive license under the Administrative Procedure Act; 
however, under that Act, there is deference to the Commissioner’s discretion.36 
In contrast to the review of a denial of a petition, a court will not directly disturb a 
determination by the Commissioner for Patents to issue a retroactive foreign filing license upon a 
finding of inadvertence, because the decision to issue a retroactive foreign filing license is 
                                                          
31 See, e.g., Union Carbide Corp. v. Microtron Corp., 254 F. Supp. 299, 300 (W.D.N.C. 1966), aff’d, 375 F.2d 438 
(4th Cir. 1967).  
32 See, e.g., Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Coleman Instruments, Inc., 338 F.2d 573, 576 (7th Cir. 1964) (after first 
U.S. application followed by a second U.S. application that was a continuation-in-part of the first application, filing 
in Great Britain and Germany prior to the expiration of six month window from filing of second U.S. filing—
retroactive license was procured); Allegheny Drop Forge Co. v. Portec, Inc., 370 F. Supp. 673, 683–84 (W.D. Pa. 
1974) (issue of fact as to whether filing French application off of U.S. continuation-in-part application was a violation 
of Invention Secrecy Act), aff’d, 541 F.2d 383 (3rd Cir. 1976). 
33 37 C.F.R. § 5.25 (2012).  The requirements are: (1) a listing of each of the foreign countries in which the unlicensed 
patent application material was filed; (2) an identification of the dates on which the material was filed in each country; 
(3) a verified statement containing (i) an averment that the subject matter in question was not under a secrecy order at 
the time that the application was filed abroad and is not currently under a secrecy order, (ii) a showing that the applicant 
diligently sought the license after discovery of the proscribed foreign filing, and (iii) an explanation of why the material 
was filed abroad through error without the required license; and (4) the requisite fee.  Id.   
34 Spound v. Mohasco Indus., Inc., No. 70–1825–F, 1975 WL 21157, at *5 (D. Mass. May 16, 1975). 
35 In re Chalenko, No. BEAG-100-D, 2017 WL 8639915, at *2–4 (Dec. Comm’r Pat. Aug. 31, 2017). 
36 Reese v. Dann, 391 F. Supp. 12, 12 (D.D.C. 1975) (finding jurisdiction to review denial of retroactive license is 
provided by the Administrative Procedure Act). 
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discretionary.37 However, if during a patent litigation an accused infringer can show fraud on the 
Patent Office, a court might consider the issue.38    
A retroactive license can be requested at any time, and thus, does not need to be procured 
prior to issuance of the U.S. patent, though the longer the delay in seeking the license,39 the more 
challenging it might be to satisfy the diligence requirement of the current regulations.40  
Additionally, a retroactive license may be sought regardless of whether an applicant or patentee’s 
invention was ever the subject of a secrecy order.41 
The Commissioner for Patents may deny a petition that merely alleges inadvertence and 
does not provide sufficient information describing the relevant circumstances.42  One of the few 
reported decisions that illustrates how the USPTO reviews requests for retroactive licenses is In re 
Application of Ovsiannikov.43  In that case, the assignee filed an initial petition for a retroactive 
foreign filing license as well as four renewed petitions.44  The initial request was made 
approximately two and one-half years after the U.S. filing, and each request failed to explain how 
the applicant had been diligent about pursuing the petition.  The petitions were denied because of 
the failure to show diligence and the failure to provide sufficient facts to describe when the relevant 
persons became aware of the delinquency.45  In making the final denial, the USPTO emphasized 
                                                          
37 See Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Norton Co., 366 F.2d 238 (6th Cir. 1966) (retroactive license cures defect), cert. 
denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (Mem.) (1967); Torin Corp. v. Philips Indus, Inc., 89 F.R.D. 346, 350 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (“the 
Court notes that the determination of ‘inadvertence’ in a foreign filing is a matter legislatively delegated to the 
Commissioner, apparent within the exercise of his sound discretion, and, as such is a matter particularly inappropriate 
for contrary determination for summary judgment”); see also Kelley Mfg. Co. v. Lilliston Corp., No. 1295, 1973 WL 
19884, at *8 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 24, 1973) (decision by the USPTO that a retroactive filing license is not necessary shall 
not be disturbed); Union Carbide Corp. v. Microtron Corp., 254 F. Supp. 299, 302 (W.D.N.C. 1966) (“purpose of 
Section 184 and 185 . . . was to prevent inadvertent disclosure of information which might prove detrimental to the 
safety and welfare of this country.  That a retroactive license was granted in this case clearly indicates that the 
prohibited foreign filing was inadvertent and not detrimental to the national interest . . .To hold the patent invalid on 
the technicality urged would be unduly harsh.”); McCormick v. Brenner, No.1288-65, 1965 WL 7765 (D.D.C. July 1, 
1965) (not disturbing discretion of Commissioner); McCulloch Motors Corp. v. Or. Saw Chain Corp., 245 F. Supp. 
851, 852 (S.D. Cal. 1965) (not disturbing discretion of Commissioner); Pillsbury Co. v. Brenner, No. 1312-65, 1965 
WL 7932 (D.D.C. June 29, 1965) (stating that the Commissioner has authority to grant license upon showing of 
inadvertence and absence of subject matter within 35 U.S.C.A. § 181 (West 2000)). 
38 Transitron Elec. Corp. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 649 F.2d 871, 880–82 (1st Cir. 1981) (entertaining claim of fraud 
based on Invention Secrecy Act); Stauffer Chem. Co. v. Monsanto Co., 623 F. Supp. 148, 148 (E.D. Mo. 1985). 
39 Davidson Rubber Co. v. Sheller Mfg. Corp., 248 F. Supp. 842, 843 (S.D. Iowa 1965) (retroactive license may be 
granted six years after patent issued and validates patent); Blake v. Bassick Co., 245 F. Supp. 635, 638 (N.D. Ill. 1965) 
(retroactive license may be granted at any time and takes the patent owner out of invalidity consequences of 35 U.S.C. 
§ 185), aff’d, 392 F.2d 879 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 828 (1968); In re Rinker and Duva, 145 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 
156 (Dec. Comm’r Pat. 1964) (“Whether or not the granting of such a license could serve to validate a patent which 
had been issued before the license was granted is, of course, a matter for determination by the courts.”).  But see Twin 
Disc, Inc. v. United States, 10 Cl. Ct. 713, 759 (1986) (petition for retroactive license after 14 years frustrates purpose 
of law). 
40 37 C.F.R. § 5.25 (2012). 
41 Reese v. Dann, 391 F. Supp. 12, 14 (D.D.C. 1975).  But see Iron Ore Co. of Canada v. Dow Chem. Co., 177 U.S.P.Q. 
34 (D. Utah 1972) (limiting circumstances in which USPTO may issue retroactive license), aff’d on other grounds, 
500 F.2d 189 (10th Cir. 1974). 
42 In re Deskey and Lurks, 157 U.S.P.Q. 352, 352 (Dec. Comm’r Pat1967); In re Sternau, 149 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 70, 70 
(Dec. Comm’r Pat.1966). 
43 No. 13-297798, 2017 WL 8639913 (Dec. Comm’r Pat. Oct. 17, 2017). 
44 Id. at *1–*7. 
45 Id. at *8. 
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that the applicant’s claim of difficulty in understanding the content and the meaning of the 
regulatory requirements would not be sufficient for the grant of the requested petition.46  
Appreciating its own lack of diligence, the applicant also requested that the USPTO waive 
the diligence requirement.47  However, the USPTO emphasized: “Circumstances resulting from 
petitioner’s failure to exercise due care, or lack of knowledge of, or failure to properly apply the 
patent statutes or rules are not, in any event, extraordinary circumstances where the interest of 
justice requires the granting of relief.”48  The USPTO was incredulous that the applicant did not 
have the ability to understand the regulatory requirements, particularly given that the invention 
was owned by Samsung and there were a myriad of patent professionals who worked on behalf of 
Samsung.49  Thus, Application of Ovsiannikov is a reminder that the USPTO does not perfunctorily 
grant retroactive foreign filing licenses. 
More recently, in In re Application of Kwon,50 another applicant petitioned the USPTO for 
a retroactive foreign filing license.  In that case, the petitioner had omitted the dates on which its 
patent application had been filed in another country and failed to show that a retroactive license 
had been diligently sought, being filed six months after discovery of a need for it.51  The USPTO 
deemed these insufficiencies in the petition to be fatal.  Thus, In re Application of Kwon, is a 
reminder that statements of error “must be supported by fact,” “should not merely be conclusory” 
and instead “must include how and why the error occurred.”52 
A seminal case regarding foreign filing licenses to make its way outside of the USPTO is 
Application of Gaertner.53  In that case, the applicant filed its priority application on June 17, 
1974.54  By January 1975, the USPTO issued its first office action and on July 28, 1975, the 
applicant filed a continuation-in-part (“CIP”) application with a declaration noting that it contained 
subject matter that was not contained in the earlier application.55  More than a month prior to filing 
the CIP, the applicant filed nine foreign counterparts to the CIP, which in the CIP declaration, the 
applicant identified to the USPTO.56  The applicant also requested a retroactive foreign filing 
license.57  However, the ex parte examiner rejected the petition because it lacked verified facts, 
and then rejected the CIP application under 35 U.S.C. § 184; the Patent and Trademark Office 
Board of Appeals affirmed.58   
Subsequently, the applicant appealed to the courts.  In reviewing the USPTO’s 
determination, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals placed a great deal of weight on the 
presence of an example in the CIP that was not contained within the parent application.59  The 
court acknowledged that within the subject matter of that new example was a well-known chemical 
compound as a reactant and a product that fell within the class of compounds of the parent 
                                                          
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at *9. 
49 Id. 
50 No. 13-750387, 2016 WL 11034019 (Dec. Comm’r Pat. 2013). 
51 Id. at *2. 
52 Id. at *1. 
53 604 F.2d 1348 (C.C.P.A. 1979).   
54 Id. at 1348. 
55 Id. at 1350.   
56 Id. at 1350–51. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 1353. 
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application.60 Nevertheless, it held that the information was subject matter that had not previously 
been disclosed to the USPTO.61  
The court emphasized that the focus should not be on whether the new matter is a 
modification, amendment or supplement of the original invention.  Instead, the issue should be on 
whether the new matter is a modification, amendment or supplement of the original application.62  
Similarly, the court noted that enablement by the parent is irrelevant.63  Thus, the court affirmed 
the USPTO and established that integrity of and compliance with the process of review for secrecy 
is critical.  Subsequently, the First Circuit suggested that the CCPA’s standard in Application of 
Gaertner stood for the proposition that “any and all information filed abroad must first be 
submitted for national security review.”64   
As a matter of practice, the use of the Patent Cooperative Treaty (“PCT”) has become the 
most common way for American applicants to pursue foreign rights in utility inventions, and, 
typically, they do so by filing in the U.S. Receiving Office.65  Because when the U.S. acts as the 
Receiving Office it screens applications for national security concerns,66 any new matter that an 
applicant adds between any priority applications and the application that is intended to be filed in 
foreign jurisdictions will automatically be screened prior the deadlines for filing those applications, 
which are thirty or thirty-one months from the priority date.67   Therefore, the greater risk for 
today’s inventors who violate the Invention Secrecy Act arises when they make their first filings 
outside of the U.S., or do not use the PCT process and file directly in a foreign jurisdiction with 
new matter in the application that is not of the general nature of the material that was within the 
scope of a foreign filing license that was previously granted. 
 
MAINTENANCE OF SECRECY PHASE 
 
Once the USPTO issues a secrecy order, the applicant must appreciate that the order applies 
to the subject matter of an invention and not only to the patent application that describes it.68  
Additionally, it applies to other patent applications that have already been filed or that are later 
filed that contain the same or a significant part of the subject matter. 69    
The USPTO has three tiers of secrecy orders: 
 
                                                          
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 1354. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Transition Elec. Corp. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 649 F.2d 871, 881 (1st Cir. 1981). The court also cited Blake v. 
Bassick Co., 245 F. Supp. 635, 636 (N.D. Ill. 1965), as following the discrepancies identical to the invention standard. 
However, Blake is a case in which a retroactive license was sought and obtained.  Id. at 638. Therefore, it is more 
properly seen as a case that defers to the discretion of the Commissioner. 
65 If all of the inventors and applicants are U.S. citizens located in the U.S., the use of the U.S. Receiving Office is 
mandatory. 35 U.S.C.A. § 361 (West 2013). 
66 35 U.S.C.A. § 368 (West 2013); 37 C.F.R. § 5.1 (2015); 37 C.F.R. § 5.11 (2015); MPEP § 1832 (9th ed. Rev. Jan. 
2018). 
67 Time Limits for Entering National/Regional Phase Under PCT Chapter I and II, WIPO (Sept. 7 2018), 
http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/texts/time_limits.html [https://perma.cc/RN2A-T33C]. 
68 MPEP § 120 [II][100-28] (9th ed. Rev. Jan. 2018). 
69 Id. 
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• Type I secrecy orders permit foreign filing in certain countries, and they may be used 
for patent applications that disclose critical technologies with military or space 
applications.70   
 
• Type II secrecy orders allow disclosure of technical information as if it were classified 
as prescribed in the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM) 
and may be used for patent applications that contain data that is properly classified or 
classifiable under a security guideline where the patent application owner has a current 
Department of Defense Security Agreement.71  
  
• Type III secrecy orders are general secrecy orders and they are used for patent 
applications that contain data that is deemed to be detrimental to national security if it 
were to be published or disclosed.72  This type of order prevents disclosure of the 
subject matter to anyone without the express written consent of the Commissioner for 
Patents.73 
 
The term of secrecy under an order is one year, but that term is renewable.74  As long as a 
secrecy order is in place, a patent will not issue,75 and it is not uncommon for a secrecy order to 
be in place for many years.76   
Until close to the end of the twentieth century, a patent term lasted for 17 years from the 
date of issuance. Under that regime, the start of the term of a patent would have been delayed by 
a secrecy order that was ultimately removed, but the duration would not change.   However, due 
to changes in commercial demand, the value of those patents and the technologies covered by them 
might still have decreased when a secrecy order had been put in place and subsequently revoked.  
Under current law, patents expire twenty years from the effective filing date.77  As one can readily 
see, a lengthy secrecy period could eat into this timeframe.  However, by statute, patent term 
adjustment is awarded in these circumstances.78 
Prosecution of a patent application will continue during the pendency of a secrecy order.79 
But if an application under a secrecy order is appealed, a hearing will not be set until the secrecy 
order is removed,80 and no interference or derivation proceeding will be instituted, though it can 
                                                          
70 Id..  The MPEP explains that this type of secrecy order is intended to permit the widest utilization of technical data 
while still controlling any publication or disclosure that would results in an unlawful exportation. Id.  The applications 
may be filed in countries in which the U.S. has reciprocal security agreement arrangements.  Id.  Currently, these 
countries are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.  Id. 
71 MPEP § 120 [I][100-28] (9th ed. Rev. Jan. 2018). This type of order serves to treat classified and classifiable 
technical data that is presented in a patent application in the same manner as other classified material.  Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 35 U.S.C.A. § 181 (West 2000); MPEP § 120 [VII][100-30] (9th ed. Rev. Jan. 2018). 
75 Foster v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 492, 493 (1987). 
76 See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, No. 278-77, 1980 WL 20809 (Ct. Cl. Jan. 25, 1980) (10 years 
under secrecy order). 
77 35 U.S.C.A. § 154(a)(2) (2015). 
78 Id. § 154(b)(1)(C). 
79 37 C.F.R. § 5.3 (2015). 
80 Id. § 5.3(a). 
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be suggested by the applicant.81  If the application reaches the allowance stage, the USPTO will 
notify the agency that caused the secrecy order to be issued and will suspend the case until the 
order is removed.82  With respect to international applications, for as long as the secrecy order is 
pending, those cases will not be forwarded from the U.S. Receiving Office to the international 
authorities.83 
During the pendency of a secrecy order, an applicant may petition for rescission of it.84 
Grounds for rescission include ineffectiveness or futility of the order.85  Additionally, an applicant 
may seek consent to disclose or to file the application abroad by obtaining a permit or a 
modification of the secrecy order.86 
If prior to or after issuance of the secrecy order, any significant part of the subject matter 
or material information was revealed to a U.S. citizen in the United States, then the principals must 
promptly inform that person of the secrecy order and the penalties for improper disclosure.87 
However, if the disclosure was made to any person in a foreign country or to a foreign national in 
the United States, then the principals must not inform the person of the secrecy order, and instead 








Congress recognized that when the USPTO issues a secrecy order, an applicant may be 
harmed, and in Section 183, provides two options for these applicants.89  These options allow an 
inventor to seek damages: (a) from the administrative agency, followed by court review after the 
patent application is deemed allowable; or (b) directly in court after the patent issues.  Under both 
options, the action may be brought at any time up to six years after issuance.90  The statute also 
contemplates two types of damages, “one for damage caused by the order of secrecy (‘damages 
claim’); and another for use by the government resulting from the applicant’s disclosure (‘use 
claim’).”91 
 
                                                          
81 Id. § 5.3(b). 
82 Id. § 5.3(c). 
83 Id. § 5.3(d). 
84 Id. § 5.4. 
85 Id. § 5.4.  
86  Id. § 5.5. 
87 MPEP § 120 [VI][100-30] (9th ed. Rev. Jan. 2018). 
88 Id. 
89 Robinson v. United States, 236 F.2d 24, 26–27 (2d Cir. 1956) (summarizing the two options); McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. United States, 670 F.2d 156, 163–64 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (damages to be paid when either the Government 
wrongfully uses the device during the period of secrecy or when the secrecy order itself causes damages). Excluded 
from the scope of persons who can sue under 35 U.S.C. § 183 are persons who were full-time employees of the federal 
government at the time of creation of their invention. Heinemann v. United States, 620 F.2d 874, 879 (Ct. Cl. 1980). 
90 Stein v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 2d 265, 272 (D. Mass. 2001). 
91 Weiss v. United States, 37 Fed. App’x 518, 521 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see also Hornback v. United States, 601 F.3d 
1382, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
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A. Option 1: Administrative Agency, followed by Court Review 
 
Under the first option, an applicant may, beginning on the date that the applicant is notified 
that except for the presence of secrecy order the patent would issue, apply to the head of the 
department or agency that caused for the order to be issued for compensation for the damages 
caused by the secrecy order and/or for the use of the invention by the Government that resulted 
from the inventor’s disclosure to the USPTO.92  With respect to the latter scenario, in a subtle 
departure from traditional patent liability, which is imposed on persons and entities that practice a 
patented invention even if they did not copy or derive it from the patent holder or know of the 
patent, under the Invention Secrecy Act, the issue is not whether the Government used an invention 
that was the subject of a secrecy order.  Instead, the issue is whether the use was wrongful and 
resulted from disclosure to the agency under the secrecy order; therefore, independent invention 
would relieve the Government of liability.93 
When pursuing this route, a prerequisite is first to apply to an administrative agency for 
compensation and then to secure either an award or a determination that no award is forthcoming.94  
Thus, under this provision, an applicant must exhaust its administrative remedies before applying 
to a court for relief.95  However, a claimant complies with this requirement if the agency refuses 
to act in a reasonable amount of time.96 
When making a claim to an administrative agency, a patent applicant or owner must 
provide a threshold amount of information.  Thus, a statement of “I will appreciate having your 
settlement as soon as possible” followed by a request from an agency for more information with 
which a plaintiff did not comply would be insufficient to allow a plaintiff access to court.97 At a 
minimum, an agency can request details as to what the claim is, how the applicant was damaged, 
and what the applicant wants in terms of money before being required to act. 98 
Similarly, the following statement has been deemed insufficient to have presented a claim 
to an administrative agency: “Claimant will, at this time, consider a settlement in toto and, provided 
that compensation is adequate, waive all future rights to royalties resulting from future use of said 
[invention].”99  Instead, that type of statement was an offer to address possible future claims.100 
In contrast to the insufficient statements noted above, Linick v. U.S.101 provides an example 
of when a submission to an agency is sufficient to constitute a claim.  In that case, the inventor 
                                                          
92 35 U.S.C.A. § 183 (West 2012). 
93 Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. United States, 107 Fed. Cl. 659, 665 (2012).  As a jurisdictional matter, a putative plaintiff 
cannot pursue an action in court until it has received a Notice of Allowance.  Horton v. United States, 2014 WL 
1028877, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2014).  Similarly, the existence of a secrecy order is a jurisdictional requirement. 
See Clark v. United States, No. 11-10C, 2014 WL 3728172, at *6 (Ct. Cl. July 28, 2014). 
94 Hornback v. United States, 40 Fed. Cl. 524, 527 (1998), aff’d, 178 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
95 Hornback, 178 F.3d at 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Stein v. United States, 41 F. Supp. 2d 68, 70 (D. Mass. 1999).  The 
Federal Circuit described the denial of an award and an unsuccessful prolonged settlement discussion to be exceptions 
that could allow a plaintiff to file a court action.  Hornback, 178 F.3d at 1308.  However, those exceptions may be 
viewed as reasonable exhaustions of pursuit of administrative relief.  See Stein, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 70 (“An award of 
zero damages, however, satisfies the exhaustion requirement.”). 
96 See Linick v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 78, 83 (2011) (inaction by nearly three years was reasonable in contrast to 
nine months).  The court in Linick noted that the Invention Secrecy Act is silent as to any time period in which an 
Agency must act and is silent as to how long a claimant must wait before going to court in the face of inaction.  Id.   
97 Constant v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 629, 633 (1989). 
98 Id. 
99 Hornback, 40 Fed. Cl. at 527. 
100 Id. 
101 96 Fed. Cl. at 78. 
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developed technologies related to munitions.102  His patent application had been subjected to a 
secrecy order for over five and one-half years, when he submitted an application for compensation 
to the Secretary of the Army.103  For two years, the Army sat on the request.104   
The Army took the position that the court lacked jurisdiction because the inventor did not 
recite a sum certain, and the Army had not issued a final disposition.105  The court held that the 
Invention Secrecy Act does not have a requirement that a claim recite a sum certain.106 Instead, 
there is a requirement for a plaintiff to act in good faith in order to allow the agency to understand 
the damages incurred, which was evidenced by Linick’s offer of cooperation and periodic inquiry 
into whether the Army needed additional information.107 The court also noted that the claimant 
alleged specific damages and showed a relationship between the secrecy order and the damages 
that he claimed.108  Further, the court noted that the Army itself was able to docket the claim 
without further information based on a fourteen-page application for compensation with three 
appendices and never requested additional information.109 Thus, a valid claim is “that which is 
sufficient to allow the parties to engage in meaningful settlement negotiations.”110 
If an agreement cannot be reached, then the patent applicant (claimant) may bring suit 
against the United States in the United States Court of Federal Claims or in the District Court of 
the United States for the District in which the claimant resides.111 This option “envisages an 
administrative settlement with subsequent judicial consideration.”112  It is worth noting that this 
first option did not exist in the U.S. code prior to the Invention Secrecy Act, which meant that prior 
to that Act inventors had no remedy until a patent issued.113  Thus, the Invention Secrecy Act 
established that the fact that a secrecy order is still pending does not divest a court of jurisdiction.114 
The procedures of this first option sound straightforward, but as the Second Circuit noted 
more than a half of a century ago: “These procedures are set forth in the act with a majestic 
simplicity that disregards the manifold problems engendered by the creation of the remedy.”115  
One of the early issues that the courts needed to resolve was whether a court could hold an in 
                                                          
102 Id. at 80. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id.  
106 Id. at 80–81. 
107 Id. at 81. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 82.  However, being able to bring a claim is not the same as being able to recover on the claim.  Ultimately, 
Mr. Linick was unsuccessful on his claim because he failed to show any actual damage or causal connection between 
the secrecy order and the damages that he claimed.  Linick v. United States, 104 Fed. Cl. 319 (2012), aff’d, 515 Fed. 
App’x 892 (Fed. Cir. 2013).  
111 35 U.S.C.A. § 183 (West 2012). This option applies to both when the agency determines that no amount is due and 
when the agency believes that less is due than that which the claimant seeks. Robinson v. United States, 236 F.2d 24, 
27–28 (2d Cir. 1956). 
112 Constant v. United States, 617 F.2d 239, 241 (Ct. Cl. 1980).  Damages needs not rise to the level of a constitutional 
taking.  Id. at 242; Farrand Optical Co. v. United States, 325 F.2d 328, 337 (2d Cir. 1963).  However, the mere act of 
issuing the secrecy order is not in and of itself a taking.  Constant v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 629 (1989) (“[T]here 
can be no Fifth Amendment Taking merely because of the issuance of the secrecy order.”).  As the Federal Circuit has 
made clear, “the United States always maintains the option of taking private property as long as it provides just 
compensation, and the secrecy orders neither enhance[] nor diminish[] that power.”  Weiss v. United States, 37 Fed. 
App’x 518 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
113 See Halpern v. United States, 258 F.2d 36, 42 (2d Cir. 1958). 
114 Id.  
115 Id. at 43. 
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camera trial to resolve issues related to compensation, which the Second Circuit answered in the 
affirmative, with the caveat that in camera review is appropriate when a district court, in its 
opinion, believes that such a proceeding can be held without running the risk of divulging military 
secrets.116 
Should the applicant elect to pursue a determination of compensation in federal court prior 
to issuance of a patent, as Mr. Clift of Connecticut learned the hard way, the applicant may be 
surprised by the duration of the process and the challenges in prevailing. In March of 1968, Clift 
had applied for a patent on a cryptographic device, and in November of that year, the 
Commissioner for Patents issued a secrecy order.117  In February of 1969, Clift filed an 
administrative claim for compensation under 35 U.S.C. § 183.118   
On June 12, 1969, the Government rescinded its order and on January 23, 1970, the 
Government denied the claim because it never used the invention and the Plaintiff had not 
submitted any evidence of damages.119  Six years later, Clift sued for damages.120 
During discovery, Clift filed a request for the production of documents related to the origin 
and design of several types of cryptographic devices used by national security and military 
agencies of the Government. 121  Following objections by the Government, Clift filed a motion to 
compel, which the court denied because of jeopardy to national security and then the court 
dismissed the complaint because without the information, Clift could not pursue his case. 122  The 
Second Circuit affirmed the decision to deny the motion to compel, but it vacated the order 
dismissing the complaint.123  The lower court then stayed the case, until the earliest time that the 
Government would be able to, consistent with 18 U.S.C. § 798,124 furnish the documents that Clift 
requested.125 
More than a decade later, the court picked up the case again.  At that time the Government 
invoked the states secrets privilege and moved to dismiss the case.126  The court agreed that 
information about the design construction and use of the Government’s cryptographic encoding 
devices would fall within the scope of the state secrets privilege and that disclosure would pose a 
reasonable danger to the nation’s defense, intelligence gathering capabilities, and diplomatic 
relations.127   
In a states secret case, a party’s need for information is irrelevant, and thus, the court 
needed to determine whether Clift could proceed without the requested information.  The court 
concluded not, holding that Clift “cannot marshal any nonprivileged circumstantial evidence to 
establish a prima facie case” and held “the only way to adjudicate this case (whether publicly or 
in camera) is to hold that the Invention Secrecy Act waives the state secrets privilege, which is a 
                                                          
116 Id. at 37. 
117 Clift v. United States, 808 F. Supp. 101, 102 (D. Conn. 1991). 
118 Id. 




123 Clift v. United States, 597 F.2d 826, 830 (2d Cir. 1979). 
124 This provision makes criminal any disclosure of information that is related to any code, cipher, or cryptographic 
system of the United States to persons who are not authorized to receive them by the President of the United States or 
the President’s designee. 18 U.S.C.A. § 798 (West 1996). 
125 Clift, 808 F. Supp. at 103. 
126 Id. at 103–04. As the court noted, the state secrets privilege is a common law evidentiary rule.  The rule protects 
information from discovery when disclosure of that information would be inimical to national security. Id. at 104. 
127 Id. at 105.   
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conclusion that this Court is not prepared to make.”128 Consequently, more than two decades after 
the USPTO issued a secrecy order, Clift was denied his day in court. 
The court in Clift was implicitly mindful that its holding could be interpreted as an assertion 
of the state secrets privilege renders toothless the provisions of the Invention Secrecy Act that 
allow inventors the ability to go to court for an independent determination as to whether they 
should be compensated.  Nevertheless, under Clift, the plaintiff must have sufficient non-privileged 
information to prove its case.129 
Further, the court in Clift deemed the Second Circuit’s suggestion in Halperin of the use 
of in camera review to be dicta, and limited to when what is at issue is the inadvertent disclosure 
of classified information and not state secrets.130  This position was not original, and eight years 
prior, the Court of Claims held that the Invention Secrecy Act is not a waiver of the state secrets 
privilege, which enabled it to conclude that in camera review of contested documents is not 
necessary if a trial court can determine from other evidence that a state secrets privilege was 
properly invoked.131    
 
B. Option 2: Direct Court Review 
 
Under the second option, the owner of an issued patent who did not pursue the first option 
may wait until the patent issues and then bring suit in the United States Court of Federal Claims.132  
In contrast to the first option, here there is no need to apply to the agency first.133 
When a patent has issued, it is not uncommon for a patent holder to seek both damages 
under 35 U.S.C. § 181 and damages for patent infringement from the government.134 Further, when 
seeking damages for patent infringement, the plaintiff may also sue private defendants in the same 
action.135 However, the Federal Circuit has been explicit that when an applicant or a patent holder 
seeks monetary relief for use by the Government under the Invention Secrecy Act, damages are 
recoverable only for pre-issuance use.136 
Regardless of which of the aforementioned options an inventor pursues, pursuant to section 
183, the patent holder may obtain pre-issuance damages, but it must show that it was harmed by 
the existence of a secrecy order.137  Thus, the plaintiff cannot obtain speculative damages, and 
instead must “prove an injury (entitlement) and damages (quantum).”138  Allegations that have 
been held to support a claim of damages are: not being able to sell an invention, no longer being 
                                                          
128 Id. at 109. 
129 Id. at 107. 
130 Id. at 109. 
131 Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 157, 161 (1983).  The American Tel. & Tel. court also deemed the 
suggestion for in camera review of the Halperin court dicta. Id. at 157 n.2 (citing Halperin v. United States, 258 F.2d 
36 (2d Cir. 1958)).  The Clift trial court held that the Invention Secrecy Act does not waive the state secrets privilege. 
808 F. Supp. at 110. 
132 35 U.S.C.A. § 183 (West 2012); see also Am. Tel. & Tel., 4 Cl. Ct. at 158–59. 
133 Hornback v. United States, 40 Fed. Cl. 524, 527 (1998). 
134 See, e.g., Goodyear Aerospace Corporation v. United States, Nos. 37-78 & 177-78, 1980 WL 20828, at *1 (Ct. Cl. 
Trail Div. Mar. 17, 1980). 
135 See, e.g., id. 
136 Hornback v. United States, 601 F.3d 1382, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
137 See, e.g., Goodyear, 1980 WL 20828, at *4. 
138 Lear Siegler, Inc. v. United States, 225 Ct. Cl. 663, 665 (1981). 
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able to market an invention, profits lost because of ruined business opportunities, and stripping of 
foreign filing rights.139   
Importantly, a plaintiff can sue under the Invention Secrecy Act for being placed under a 
secrecy order, even if there was no delay in issuance of a patent, provided that the plaintiff can 
adequately prove that it suffered damages.140  This situation can arise if the USPTO rescinds the 
secrecy order prior to allowance.141 Examples of harm that have been alleged even if there is no 
delay caused by the secrecy order include: a rejection of applications for loans because of the 
secrecy order, an inability to demonstrate the technology to prospective users and licensees, and 
the selection of other technologies by prospective users.142  However, at least one court has 
concluded that attorneys’ fees and other expenses that are incurred when contesting the imposition 
of a secrecy order are not recoverable under the Invention Secrecy Act.143 
Further, even if one gets to trial, the burden of proof can be difficult to meet, as inventor 
Hendrick Hayes learned in Haynes v. United States.144  In that case Haynes owned several patents 
related to marine engineering.  The USPTO issued a secrecy order with respect to a patent directed 
to a marine propulsion device with a gaseous boundary layer for the thrust jet flow stream, 
exhibiting stealth and ice lubrication properties.145  The secrecy order was in place for a little more 
than two years.146 
Haynes first filed an administrative claim to the Navy, which the Navy denied because the 
claim was too speculative.147  Subsequently, he filed suit in the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Washington, seeking 24 million dollars.148  The Government moved for 
summary judgement, taking the position that damages were speculative.149  At trial, Haynes 
presented evidence that his business declined because the secrecy order prevented him from 
actively marketing his other product as well as the invention that was the subject of the secrecy 
order.150  The district court held in favor of the Government because Haynes did not show that he 
lost any sales, sustained any losses, or experienced any decline in the value of his business as a 
result of the secrecy order.151 
The Federal Circuit affirmed, noting that Haynes could still market and sell the inventions 
of his earlier patents, and that he failed to provide clear evidence of a potential or existing market 
                                                          
139 Damnjanovic v. U.S. Dep’t of Air Force, 135 F. Supp. 3d 601, 604–05 (E.D. Mich. 2015). 
140 Constant v. United States, 617 F.2d 239, 240 (Ct. Cl. 1980). 
141 See, e.g., id. at 241–42. 
142 Id. at 244. Although on appeal the plaintiff was deemed to have sufficiently alleged damages, at trial he was unable 
to prove them.  Constant v. United States, 1 Cl. Ct. 600 (1982), aff’d, 714 F.2d 162 (Fed Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 
U.S. 1041 (1984).   
143 Constant, 1 Ct. Ct. at 608. 
144 178 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1116 (1999). 
145 Haynes, 178 F.3d at 1307. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. He also made the peculiar request that: 
the court treat his business as a “casualty of war;” to require the United States to 
issue a “thank you” and a medal of commendation or certificate of appreciation 
to all inventors who have been the subjects of secrecy orders; to require the small 
business administration to accord preferential treatment; and to require the United 
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for the invention that was the subject of the secrecy order.152  Further, the Federal Circuit agreed 
that Haynes did not show that the decline and close of his business were tied to the secrecy order.153   
Another instructive case is Weiss v. United States.154  In that case, the Government issued 
a secrecy order of Type I, which would have allowed the inventor to file for patent protection in 
certain counties that would protect secrecy and to disclose the invention to U.S. citizens and 
permanent residents for legitimate business purposes.155  The inventor elected not to file for foreign 
patent protection.156  After being unsuccessful in the administrative route, the patent holder filed 
suit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts.157   
With respect to damages, the plaintiff argued that the U.S. Government had an exclusive 
option to the invention and that he was prevented from exploiting the technology outside of the 
United States.158  However, the court held that there was no evidence to support the inference that 
he was damaged and there was no causal connection between the secrecy orders and alleged 
damages.159  With respect to the alleged exclusive option, the court noted that the order was neither 
exclusive nor an option.160  The court emphasized that of the three types of secrecy order, the one 
at issue was the least restrictive.161  With respect to the foregoing of foreign rights, Weiss explained 
his inaction as a misunderstanding that he would have waived all rights to compensation under the 
Invention Secrecy Act had he pursued foreign rights as allowed in the secrecy order.162  However, 
the waiver under the Type I secrecy order that he received was one of claims against foreign 
countries, not against the United States under the Invention Secrecy Act.163 
The court also explained that Weiss had no basis on which to show damages because there 
was no evidence that he ever licensed his patent or exercised his right to exclude; there was no 
evidence that anyone ever practiced or would practice the invention; and there was no evidence of 
any actual or potential customers, domestic or foreign either at the time of the litigation or at the 
time of the secrecy order.164  Together, Haynes and Weiss emphasize the challenges in proving a 




The vast majority of patent applicants will quickly receive a foreign filing license shortly 
after they file their patent applications.165  But the relatively small percentage of patent applications 
                                                          
152 Id. 
153 Id.  Haynes went so far as to admit that at least part of the decline was due to the stock market decline of 1987. Id. 
154 146 F. Supp. 2d 113 (D. Mass 2001), aff’d, 37 Fed. App’x 518 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
155 Weiss, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 113. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 126. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
161 Id.  The court was particularly annoyed by the argument that the Government received an exclusive option.  As the 
court noted, as a sovereign, the U.S. can always take private property; the only issue is just compensation. Id. at 127. 
162 Id. at 127–28. 
163 Id. at 128. 
164 Id. 
165 Between approximately 5500 and 6000 patent applications are currently subject to secrecy orders. Arvind Dilawar, 
The U.S. Government’s Secret Inventions, SLATE (May 9, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://slate.com/technology/2018/05/the-
thousands-of-secret-patents-that-the-u-s-government-refuses-to-make-public.html [http://perma.cc/46RE-YTWK]. 
By contrast, the USPTO issued approximately 350,000 patents in the fiscal year 2017. Number of Patents Issued in 
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that are subject to secrecy orders should not give patent applicants the sense of security that they 
can ignore the Invention Secrecy Act.  Failure to wait to engage in foreign filings before receiving 
the appropriate license can prove fatal.  Further, if an applicant is subject to a secrecy order, it 
should be aware that the burden for proving damages from the secrecy order can be a cumbersome 
one.  The potential catastrophic harm of failing to abide by the USPTO’s screening process for 
inventions that implicate national security and the hurdle for proving damages demonstrate the 
critical role that Congress has given to the USPTO in protecting the nation against potentially 
damaging disclosure of new technologies. 
                                                          
the United States from FY 1994 to FY 2017, STATISTA (2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/256571/number-of-
patent-grants-in-the-us/ [https://perma.cc/G3TZ-7MY3].  Because secrecy orders can last for many years and not all 
patent applications that are subject to secrecy orders issue, it is difficult to determine the exact number patent filings 
that have been or are subject to secrecy orders. 
